State of Utah v. Samuel Enricque Bracero, Arturo Ruiz : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
State of Utah v. Samuel Enricque Bracero, Arturo
Ruiz : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; David O. Leavitt;
Juab County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellant.
Alan Dayton; Jere Reneer; Attorney for Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Bracero, No. 981529 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1777
W • n n ^ , 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS* F U 
BRIEF 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
SAMUEL ENRICQUE BRACERO, 
ARTURO RUIZ, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
.A10 
SOCKET NO. - 9SK37 
Case No. 981529-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE PRE-TRIAL DISMISSAL OF AN 
INFORMATION CHARGING POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA 
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1996), 
DRIVING ON SUSPENSION, A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-227 (1998), AND 
SPEEDING, A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-46 (Supp. 1998), IN THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, JUAB COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, PRESIDING 
ALAN DAYTON 
JERE RENEER 
275 North Main 
P.O. Box 298 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Attorney for Appellee 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-1080 
DAVID O. LEAVITT p*, , 
JUAB COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Utah Court of Aopeate 
Attorneys for Appellant OCT 2 0 1999 
Julia D'AJesandro 
Olerk of tho Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
• • 
SAMUEL ENRICQUE BRACERO, 
ARTURO RUIZ, : 
Defendants/Appellees. : 
Case No. 981529-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE PRE-TRIAL DISMISSAL OF AN 
INFORMATION CHARGING POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA 
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1996), 
DRIVING ON SUSPENSION, A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-227 (1998), AND 
SPEEDING, A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-46 (Supp. 1998), IN THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, JUAB COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, PRESIDING 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-1080 
DAVID O. LEAVITT 
JUAB COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ALAN DAYTON 
JERE RENEER 
275 North Main 
P.O. Box 298 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Attorney for Appellee Attorneys for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' POINT ONE 1 
A. Because Neither Defendant Could Lawfully Drive, the Request to 
Search Did Not Create Any Detention Outside the Ongoing Traffic 
Purpose of the Stop 1 
B. Any Detention Outside the Traffic Purpose of the Stop Was 
Supported by Reasonable Suspicion of Defendants' Involvement in 
Drug Trafficking 4 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S POINT II 9 
A. No Clear Error in Trial Court's Finding of Consent 9 
B. No Necessity to Remand for Additional Findings 11 
CONCLUSION 12 
ADDENDA - No addendum necessary 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275 (7th Cir. 1996) 5 
United States v. Ledesma-Dominguez, 53 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 1995) 5 
United States v. Pollington, 98 F.3d 341 (8th Cir. 1996) 6 
ST TE CASES 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchg, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) 10 
Gardner v. Marsden, 949 P.2d 785 (Utah App. 1997) 10 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) 3, 9 
People v. Easley, 680 N.E.2d 776 (111. App. 1997), 
cert, denied, U.S. , 119 S.Ct. 1144 (1999) 6, 7 
State v. Armstrong, 659 N.E.2d 844 (Ohio App. 1995) 6 
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990) 10 
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992) 7 
State v. Margraves, 806 P.2d 228 (Utah App. 1991) 10 
State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137 (Utah App. 1997) 7 
State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990) 10 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) 2 
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990) 3, 10 
State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647 (Utah App. 1998) 2 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) 11 
11 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d431 (Utah App. 1990) 7 
State v. Shephard, 955 P.2d 352 (Utah 1998) 5 
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996) 3, 9 
State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831 (Utah App. 1995) 8 
State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d922 (Utah App. 1994) 9 
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980) 11 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah R. App. P. 24 2 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
SAMUEL ENRICQUE BRACERO, 
ARTURO RUIZ, : 
Defendants/Appellees. : 
Case No. 981529-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State/Appellant's opening 
brief, the State submits the following points in reply to the statements and arguments 
contained in defendant/appellee's responsive brief. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' POINT ONE 
A. Because Neither Defendant Could Lawfully Drive, the 
Request to Search Did Not Create Any Detention Outside 
the Ongoing Traffic Purpose of the Stop 
Any detention engendered by the trooper's request to search for contraband in this 
case was justified on the ground that it was merely incident to the ongoing traffic purpose 
of the stop. See Aplt. Br. at 12-15. Indeed, the trial court found that neither defendant 
was legally authorized to possess or drive the Tempo (R. 150), Aplt. Br., add. H. This 
critical factual finding is the linchpin of the State's argument regarding the propriety of 
the ongoing detention. Aplt. Br. at 13-15 (citing (R.160: 15), add. C). See State v. Lonez, 
873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) ("Investigative questioning that further detains the 
driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity/'); 
State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647 648 (Utah App. 1998) (defendant was not unjustifiably 
detained where trooper looked into defendant's truck as a safety precaution before 
requesting vehicle registration information). Consequently, the State disagrees only with 
the trial court's legal conclusion that, in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of other 
criminality, defendants were improperly detained by the request to search. Aplt. Br. at 
13. 
Defendants' responsive brief acknowledges that the trooper "could have detained 
and arrested defendants for traffic violations," and that the Tempo "might have been 
stolen," but asserts that it simply "does not matter[.]" Aple. Br. at 12. Instead, defendants 
contend that the trooper should have ignored his reasonable suspicion that the vehicle 
may have been stolen, ignored the fact that neither defendant was a licensed driver, and 
should have simply issued a traffic citation before allowing defendants to proceed on their 
way. Aple. Br. at 8-9. Defendants' glib assertion is unsupported by citation to authority 
and is contrary to Lopez, O'Brien, and other controlling authority. See Aplt. Br. at 12-15. 
See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), (b) (requiring appellee to support contentions with 
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citation to authorities relied upon).1 It is also contrary to the trial court's factual findings 
(R 150), Aplt. Br., add. H. 
As appellees defendants may offer an alternative ground upon which to affirm the 
lower court's ruling. State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356-57 (Utah 1996) However, any 
alternative argumcm must be clearly supported in the record. Leigh Furniture and Carpet 
Co. v. horn, 657 ?.2.i 293, 301 (Utah 1982). Here, the trial court found that neither 
defendant was legally authorized to drive; therefore, defendants' alternative argument that 
the trooper should have cited and released defendants, is not supported in the record and 
defendants cannot prevail in their claim without demonstrating that the trial court's 
findings are clearly erroneous. Cf State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475 (Utah 1990) 
("When challenging the findings of fact of the trial court on appeal, the [challenging 
party] must show that the findings of fact were clearly erroneous."). Significantly, 
defendants make no such challenge here. See Aplt. Br. at 8-10. Nor could they. It is 
undisputed that Bracero's license was suspended and that Ruiz's license was expired (R. 
160: 15-16, 39), Apit. Br., add. C.2 Thus, contrary to defendants' assertion, Trooper Metz 
defendants' responsive brief is primarily directed toward the State's alternative 
argument, that even assuming defendants were detained beyond the traffic purpose of the 
stop by the trooper's request for consent, that detention was justified by reasonable 
suspicion. The State further addresses this argument in part B of this point. 
defendants' complaint that Trooper Metz did not specifically ask Ruiz for a 
driver's license, Aple. Br. at 9, avails them nothing. After learning that Bracero's license 
was suspended, the trooper asked Ruiz for identification and Ruiz provided the trooper 
with citizenship papers only (R. 160:15), Aplt. Br., add. C. The trooper did not 
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was not free to cite defendants and allow them to proceed on their way. S<>e Aplt. Br. at 
14. 
In sum, defendants' assertion that the trooper should have simply cited and 
released them is not clearly supported in the record. Defendants simply cannot 
demonstrate that the trial court's factual finding, that neither was legally authorized to 
drive, is clearly erroneous. Indeed, Bracero's license was suspended and Ruiz's license 
was expired. Moreover, defendants' assertion is also devoid of supportive authority. 
Therefore, the State's argument, that the trooper's request to search did not unjustifiably 
detain defendants, stands unrebutted. The trial court's erroneous legal conclusion, that 
defendants were improperly detained by the request, should thus be overturned. 
B. Any Detention Outside the Traffic Purpose of the Stop 
Was Supported by Reasonable Suspicion of Defendants9 
Involvement in Drug Trafficking 
Even assuming, arguendo, defendants were detained beyond legitimate traffic 
purposes by the trooper's request to search, that detention was justified by reasonable 
suspicion. Aplt. Br. at 16-22. In arguing to the contrary, defendants make the same 
immediately inquire if Ruiz had a valid driver's license, and it is not clear when the 
trooper confirmed that Ruiz's license was in fact expired (R. 160: 39), Aplt. Br., add. C. 
However, even if the trooper had specifically, inquired about Ruiz's license at the same 
time he asked about Bracero's license, defendants fail to demonstrate that Ruiz could 
have lawfully driven the Tempo away, nor could they, in light of Ruiz's expired license 
(R. 160: 39), Aplt. Br., add. C. 
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mistakes the trial court made: they misapply the totality of the circumstances and ignore 
controlling authority. 
Tlic ti ial ourt's critical error - an error appellant follows on appeal - was in 
viewing each of the factors contributing to the reasonable suspicion calculus in isolation 
(see R. 152-150), Aplt. Br., add. H. Contrary to the trial court's erroneous isolation 
analysis, factors contributing to reasonable suspicion must be seen as part of the "totality 
of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 
352, 355 (Utah 1998). 
Here, it is undisputed that Trooper Metz detected the strong odor of air freshener, a 
recognized masking agent, and that Ruiz had a history of drug smuggling (R. 152-50), 
Aplt. Br., adi The confluence of these factors is alone sufficient to create reasonable 
suspicion that defendants were involved in drug trafficking. Aplt. t5 7 (citing United 
States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 57 F.3d 895, 898 (10th Cir. 1995) (reasonable suspicion 
established based on use of masking agent and computer hit indicating that defendant had 
previously been referred to Customs for zero tolerance drugs"); United States v. Stone, 
866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989) (reasonable suspicion established based on use of 
recognized masking agent and DEA computer indication that defendant was involved in 
drug trafficking)). See also United States v. Ledesma-Dominguez, 53 F.3d 1159, 1161 
(10th Cir. 1995) (absence of personal identification, together with defendant's nervous 
behavior and presence of masking odor established reasonable suspicion); United States 
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v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1996) (defendant's suspicious behavior and 
criminal history including two prior drug convictions constituted reasonable suspicion for 
detention); United States v. Pollington, 98 F.3d 341 (8th Cir. 1996) (odor of masking 
agent, together with defendant's suspicious story and visibly nervous conduct sufficient to 
establish reasonable suspicion); People v. Easley, 680 N.E.2d 776, 780 (111. App. 1997) 
(marijuana leaf decoration in defendant's wallet, together with defendant's visible 
nervousness, suspicious behavior, and prior drug conviction established reasonable 
suspicion), cert, denied, U.S. , 119 S.Ct 1144 (1999); State v. Armstrong, 659 
N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ohio App. 1995) (high crime area and suspicious nature of defendant's 
activity in huddling with a group with hands moving within the tight group, together with 
defendant's history of drug offenses, created reasonable suspicion). Added to these 
compelling factors, however, are the additional facts in this case that the stop occurred on 
a recognized drug route (1-15), defendants were unusually nervous in that they refused to 
make eye contact with the trooper, and neither defendant was legally authorized to drive 
or posses the Tempo.3 While any one of the above factors would not by itself support 
3The trial court discounted the trooper's additional observations of maps, a cell 
phone, and gapped molding (R. 151-50), Aplt. Br., add. H. For reasons stated in its 
opening brief, the State disagrees with the trial court's rulings in this regard. Aplt. Br. at 
19 n.6. However, as noted previously, the strong smell of masking agent and Ruiz's drug 
history are themselves so compelling that the reasonable suspicion determination does not 
turn on the presence of these disputed factors. Thus, even assuming the trial court 
properly discounted the trooper's observations in this regard, there remains reasonable 
suspicion defendants were involved in drug trafficking. 
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reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, when properly considered together, they amount 
to reasonable suspicion as a matter of law. See Apit. Br. at 16-20. See Easley, 680 
N.E.2d at 780 ("Even where there may be an innocent explanation for each individual 
factor considered separately, the factors viewed in combination may constitute enough 
reasonable suspicion to warrant further detention.'9). 
The trial court's error in conducting an "isolation," as opposeu to a 
"totality,"analysis is compounded by its failure to give any weight to the Ruiz's drug 
smuggling history (R. 152-50), Aplt. Br., add. H. This failure was driven by the trial 
court's misapprehension of State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah App. 1997), 
which in fact clarifies that criminal history may be a factor in determining reasonable 
suspicion. Aplt. Br ill 11 Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it 
failed to consider Ruiz's history of drug smuggling in its evaluation of reasonable 
suspicion here (see R. 152-50), Aplt. Br., add. H. Defendants' responsive brief does not 
address the trial court's misreading of Humphrey. Indeed, while defendants acknowledge 
that Ruiz h;ul ,i history of drug smuggling in their Statement of Facts, Aple. Br. at 5, this 
compelling fact is not otherwise mentioned or analyzed in defendants' brief. Thus, once 
again, the State's assertion of error below is effectively unrebutted. 
Finally, to the extent that defendants attempt to support the trial court's erroneous 
conclusion that no reasonable suspicion existed, their analysis lacks merit. Defendants 
rely on State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992) and State v. Robinson, 797 
7 
P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), to support the trial coi,rt's determination of no reasonable 
suspicion. While these cases involve traffic-stops-turned-criminal-investigations, that is 
where the similarity to the instmt case ends. Neither Godina-Luna nor Robinson involves 
a traffic stop where the evolving criminal investigation was triggered by the observation 
and detection of the strong odor of a known masking agent, together with one of the 
suspect's having a criminal history of drug smuggling. Because these compelling factors 
are absent in both Godina-Luna and Robinson - they do not support to the trial court's 
erroneous conclusion here. 
In sum, the trial court's findings that a) the trooper observed and detected the 
strong odor of a recognized masking agent, and that b) Ruiz had a criminal history of 
drug smuggling, are themselves sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for any 
detention beyond the traffic purpose of the stop. Add in facts that the stop occurred on a 
known drug route, that neither defendant was authorized to possess or drive the car, and 
that defendants exhibited unusual nervousness in consistently refusing to make eye 
contact with the trooper, and reasonable suspicion is abundantly established here. 
Because the trial court failed to properly view these factors as a totality, and also 
misapprehended controlling Fourth Amendment authority, it erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking was absent here. The trial 
court's suppression ruling therefore exceeds legal boundaries and should be reversed. Cf. 
State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831, 835 n.5 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 
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922, 929 (Utah App. 1994) (evaluating custody determinations and observing that "fact 
sensitive" determinations by a trial court are accorded a "measure of discretion," unless 
the determination exceeds established legal boundaries."). 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'POINXJI 
A. No Clear Error in Trial Court's Finding of Consent 
The trial court found that defendants consented to the search, but that the search 
was tainted by the preceding alleged illegal detention (R. 150), Aplt. Br., add. H. 
Defendants "disagree" with the trial court's factual finding of consent. Aple. Br. at 13. 
As previously noted, defendants as appellees may offer an alternative ground for 
affirmance. South, 924 P.2d at 356-57. However, any alternative ground must be clearly 
supported in the record. Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co., 657 P.2d at 301. Because the 
trial court found that consent was given (R. 151), Aplt. Br., add. H, defendants once again 
fail to demonstrate clear record support for their alternative ground that no consent 
occurred, /\iid, as set forth below, they also fail to demonstrate any clear error in the trial 
court's factual finding of consent. Defendants thus fail to present any valid alternative 
ground for affirmance. 
ttacking the trial court's finding of consent, defendants focus on the credibility 
of Trooper Metz's testimony that he in fact requested consent. Aple. Br. at 1.3-
4In Point 11(D) of their brief, defendants question the motivation of the troopers in 
this case. The trial court dismissed these aspersions below, expressly declining to adopt 
that portion of defendants' brief (R. 72). This Court should do likewise. 
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Thus, the dispute is a factual one. The^fore, defendants cannot prevail in their challenge 
to the trial court's acceptance of the trooper's testimony over their own, without 
demonstrating clear error therein. State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing that witness 
credibility is a factual finding which the trial court is in the best position to evaluate). 
This defendants have not, and cannot do. First, defendant's have not marshaled the 
evidence supporting the trial court's finding of consent and demonstrated that viewed in 
its most favorable light, it is insufficient to support the trial court's finding. See Aple. Br. 
at 13-14. Cf. Moosman, 794 P.2d at 475. This is grounds alone to reject their claim. 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchg. 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991). 
Second, even assuming defendants had properly marshaled the supporting 
evidence, it is presumed on appeal that the fact-finder believed that evidence which 
supports its verdict. See State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah) (jury), cert, denied, 804 
P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); Gardner v. Marsden, 949 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah App. 1997) (trial 
court). Accordingly, the trooper's testimony that he obtained consent from defendant 
Bracero (R. 160: 19-21), is alone sufficient to support the trial court's finding of consent. 
Id. "Merely arguing that the trial court should have believed defendants' evidence, rather 
than plaintiffs, does not meet the clear error standard." Gardner, 949 P.2d at 790. 
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B. No Necessity to Remand For Additional Findings 
To the extent defendants suggest that defendant Bracero's consent was not 
voluntary and knowing, the trial court did not make any explicit findings in this regard. 
However, the trial court invalidated the consent on the sole ground that it was tainted by 
the prior alleged illegal detention (R. 150), Aplt. Br., add. H. Thus, assuming the validity 
of the detention, the reasonable inference from the trial court's ruling is that the consent 
was otherwise knowing and voluntary. State v, Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 n.6 (Utah 
1991) (reviewing court upholds the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the 
record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such 
findings). 
The inference of a knowing and voluntary consent is also supportable in the 
record. Trooper Metz claimed no authority to search, nor was the consent obtained by a 
show offeree, or by deception or trick (R. 160: 19-21), Aplt. Br., add. C. And, 
defendants were cooperative (id). See State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 
1980) (factors relevant to knowing and voluntary consent include absence of a show of 
authority or force, deception or trick and the presence of a mere request and cooperation 
by the owner). Defendants engage in no contrary analysis of the Whittenback factors. 
See Aple. Br. at 14. 
Therefore, assuming this Court accepts the State's argument and finds the 
preceding detention lawful, there is no need to remand for findings on the validity of the 
11 
otherwise untainted consenf to search which justified the seizure of contraband from 
defendants' vehicle.5 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the Court should overturn the trial court's erroneous 
suppression of evidence in this case and remand for trial on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on 2 P October 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
fAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that onj^ October 1999,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of this REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to: 
ALAN DAYTON 
JERE RENEER 
275 North Main 
P.O. Box 298 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
l/lhM^CjU^M\_ 
5The State does not contend that the instant search was justified under any other 
exception to the warrant requirement and therefore does not further respond to defendants 
arguments in that regard. See Aple. Br. at 15-16. 
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